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How can we measure the costs and benefits of
changes in financial reporting standards?
Katherine Schipper*
Abstract— This paper first describes the components of a conventional cost-benefit analysis, a decision tool that is widely
used to evaluate large public-sector projects such as dams. It then compares a conventional cost-benefit analysis to the
approaches used by financial reporting standard-setters and others to evaluate the costs and benefits of changes in
authoritative accounting guidance. The last portion of the paper describes how accounting research provides analyses of
effects of changes in accounting standards and describes how these effects-analyses differ from, and are similar to, a
conventional cost-benefit analysis.
Keywords: cost-benefit analysis; financial reporting standards; capital market effects of changes in accounting standards
1. Introduction
This paper discusses a recurring and vexatious issue
in financial reporting standard-setting: the practic-
ability of analysing the costs and benefits of a given
change in financial reporting standards.1 That issue
raises, at least, the following questions. First, why is
analysis of costs and benefits viewed as desirable or,
to put it more strongly, necessary as part of the
process of establishing authoritative guidance for
financial reporting? Second, to what extent are
conventional cost-benefit analysis techniques
applicable in the financial reporting context?
Third, what approaches have been taken by
accounting researchers and standard-setters to
analyse cost and benefits, and what can we learn
from their efforts?
I view the question of analysing the costs and
benefits of a given change in financial reporting
standards as a special case of the more general
question of analysing the costs and benefits of a
specific mandatory change in corporate reporting
activity generally, for example, a change in fre-
quency of required reports; a change in the amount
of time permitted between the end of a reporting
period and the due date of a required financial
report; a requirement that financial reports filed with
a securities regulator contain a Management
Discussion and Analysis. The broader issue that
encompasses both financial reporting standards and
corporate reporting more generally is the costs and
benefits of having a mandatory system for financial
reporting. I focus only on the analysis of changes in
accounting standards and do not address the larger
issue of whether financial reporting should be
regulated and if so how and by whom, while
recognising both the importance and the controver-
sial nature of the larger issue. That is, I take as given
that statutes and regulations in many jurisdictions
require listed (and sometimes unlisted) entities to
apply specified financial reporting standards, and I
do not consider how other factors such as corporate
governance concerns affect financial reporting
standards. Although the analysis of costs and
benefits of changes in financial reporting standards
is but one (relatively narrow) issue in the overall
question of how best to regulate corporate report-
ing, I believe that some of the ideas considered in
this paper could be pertinent to the consideration of
that larger question.2
This paper builds on Meeks and Meeks’ (2001)
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1 This paper is not intended to provide a survey or discussion
of research that pertains to cost-benefit analysis generally, or the
costs and benefits of financial reporting standards generally or
the costs and benefits of a specific standard. I refer to published
and unpublished papers only to illustrate certain aspects of my
discussion.
2 The regulation of corporate reporting is an example of
financial regulation. There is a long history of research on
financial regulation, and debates continue. For a recent survey,
see Leuz and Wysocki (2008) who discuss a broad array of
accounting, finance, economics and legal research that con-
siders, among other things, the costs and benefits of regulating
corporate disclosures.
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review of certain issues involved, and techniques
used, in measuring costs and benefits of accounting
regulation.3 Their paper provides quantitative
measures of certain costs associated with account-
ing regulation, including, for example, the operat-
ing budgets of accounting standard-setters and
estimates of compliance costs based on preparer
survey data for selected standards as reported by
other researchers. They also provide estimates for
certain other costs and benefits. Meeks and Meeks
point to four sources of benefits from accounting
regulation: reducing information search costs,
signalling costs and contracting costs; and reducing
the problems associated with market failures. In
their discussions, therefore, they are considering the
costs and benefits of standard-setting, compliance
and enforcement combined, under the rubric of
accounting regulation, and not necessarily the costs
and benefits of any specific change in any of these
activities.
With regard to the first benefit of accounting
regulation, the reduction of information search
costs, Meeks and Meeks estimate those costs as
the difference between the costs of active and
passive portfolio management; in their analysis, the
amount is 0.15% of the value of UK listed securities
in 1998. With regard to signalling costs, Meeks and
Meeks point to research that identifies dividend
payments as costly signalling mechanisms for
managers to convey information to shareholders
(presumably, in the absence of fully effective
alternative mechanisms such as mandatory report-
ing) and capture the signalling costs of dividends as
the tax penalty imposed on dividends, noting that
this cost is idiosyncratic to a given tax regime.
Finally, Meeks and Meeks discuss but do not
provide a mechanism for quantifying the contract-
ing benefits of accounting regulation. Meeks and
Meeks also describe the well-known difficulties
associated with the dissemination of false or
misleading information, including the breakdown
of markets as in, for example, Akerlof (1970).4
Meeks and Meeks provide examples, including
quantitative examples, of analyses of specific costs
and benefits of disclosure regulation generally
(e.g. the tax costs of dividend signalling) and
point the way toward additional analyses. In
contrast, I focus on the concept of analysing costs
and benefits and the extent to which this concept is,
as a practical matter, applicable to financial report-
ing standard-setting and to the evaluation of a given
change in standards. I also extend the discussion of
how to measure the benefits of financial reporting
standards to incorporate examples from recent
academic research.
This paper is also related to the Financial
Accounting Standards Board’s (FASB) Special
Report: Benefits, Costs and Consequences of
Financial Accounting Standards (FASB, 1991).
This lengthy report lays out several issues that I
cover in this discussion paper, describes how the
FASB thinks about costs and benefits (at least, circa
1991) and provides a fascinating transcript of a
1990 discussion of the measurability of costs and
benefits of accounting standards amongmembers of
the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory
Council (FASAC) and FASB board members.
Allowing for changes in research designs and the
refinement of both empirical techniques and meas-
urement in accounting research, I believe the points
made in the Special Report remain valid.
This paper is also related to surveys and discus-
sions of research on causes and consequences of
financial reporting and disclosure regulation gener-
ally. One representative recent paper is Leuz and
Wysocki (2008) which surveys both certain theories
of voluntary and mandatory disclosures and certain
empirical research on the effects of voluntary
reporting and disclosure decisions and on certain
regulatory changes such as the adoption in the US of
Regulation Fair Disclosure (Reg FD). Leuz and
Wysocki (and other similar survey/discussion
papers) are not specifically concerned with cost-
benefit analyses of individual accounting standards.
In some cases, they discuss research related to
individual regulatory changes (for example, Reg
FD and certain provisions of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act of 2002) and to wholesale changes in account-
ing standards such as voluntary or mandatory
adoptions of International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS). Relative to these broad surveys
of academic research, my discussion paper is
limited, being concerned only with financial report-
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 14/6/2010 16 ABR Schipper.3d Page 310 of 328
3 As discussed in more detail later, Meeks and Meeks (2001)
use the term ‘accounting regulation’ to refer to financial
accounting standard-setting, auditing/assurance and enforce-
ment, and to refer to the overall system of regulation as well as,
in some of their discussions, specific standards. In contrast, I
focus on financial accounting standard-setting, including the
distinction that a standard-setter such as the Financial
Accounting Standards Board (FASB) or International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) lacks enforcement powers
and is therefore not a regulator.
4 Akerlof (1970) describes a market in which goods may be
honestly described or dishonestly described and argues that the
dishonest market agents will drive the honest agents out of the
market. That is, those who are willing and able to describe bad
items as good items will deter legitimate buyers and sellers from
transacting in that market. The total cost of this information
problem is the sum of the amount by which purchasers are
cheated and the opportunity loss associated with the transactions
that do not occur.
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ing standards, and narrowly focused on the practi-
calities of cost-benefit considerations.
I make the following arguments about the
practicability of measuring the costs and benefits
of financial reporting standards. First, although the
mission statements and conceptual frameworks of
standard-setters such as the International
Accounting Standards Board (IASB) and the
FASB specify a costs and benefits constraint, and
some of the authoritative guidance promulgated by
these boards contains an explicit costs and benefits
discussion, standard-setters do not, in fact, apply a
conventional cost-benefit analysis. Second, a con-
ventional cost analysis of a specific standard or
standards may be possible (in the sense of doable)
but the difficulties and attendant costs may be
unreasonable, making the analysis impracticable in
a financial reporting standard-setting context. Third,
and in contrast to a view that the benefits of
accounting standards are more elusive than the
costs, academic accounting research has tended to
focus more on assessing the capital market and
financial reporting benefits of financial reporting
standards and less on the implementation costs of
those standards. However, the results of this
research may be insufficiently nuanced and con-
sistent to be entirely useful in a practical standard-
setting context.
This paper is organised as follows. The second
section describes some of the ideas that support
cost-benefit analysis as it is conventionally used and
the third section discusses the applicability of these
ideas to financial reporting standards. The fourth
section discusses possible approaches to analysing
the effects of accounting standards, including how
academic accounting research has attempted to
quantify certain of those effects. The final section
offers some concluding comments.
2. The purpose of analysing costs and
benefits
Cost-benefit analysis is a variant of conventional
capital budgeting techniques that are widely used
to compare the costs and benefits of a potential
investment project, for example, acquiring and
using a new computer system. It is therefore an ex
ante decision tool that is used before a project is
undertaken. Modern cost-benefit analysis is gen-
erally traced to the 1936 Flood Control Act in the
US, which required that the US government
should engage in flood control projects ‘if the
benefits to whomsoever they may accrue are in
excess of the estimated costs’, that is, if the project
has a positive expected net present value.
Formulated this way, cost-benefit analysis does
not address the distribution of costs and benefits,
but rather their existence and relative expected
magnitudes, and it does not address the realised
outcome of the project, but rather expectations
about those outcomes.5
Cost-benefit analysis has become a widely used
tool of public sector decision-making, often to
assist in the evaluation of large, difficult-to-reverse
projects such as dams, bridges and roads. It has
been extended to include analyses of certain health
and public policy regulations, where the benefits
may be associated with hard-to-quantify outcomes
such as lives saved or lifetimes extended.6 In the
absence of a profit-maximisation rule, as is often
the case for public sector projects, cost-benefit
analysis provides a signal for resource allocation
decisions.
A cost-benefit analysis of a public sector
proposal enters the decision process after policy
analysts have defined the problem to be addressed
(or, alternatively, identified the public policy
objective to be achieved) and identified feasible
solutions or courses of action, including maintain-
ing the status quo. The cost-benefit analysis will:
(1) identify the time period of analysis, that is, the
period over which costs and benefits are to be
estimated; (2) identify the costs and benefits to be
included for each alternative, including the status
quo; (3) wherever possible, assign monetary
values to each cost and each benefit; (4) discount
the monetary values of costs and benefits using an
appropriate discount rate. The resulting net benefit
or cost of each feasible alternative, including the
status quo, forms one input into the policy
decision.
Factors that complicate a cost benefit analysis
include difficulties in identifying the time period
over which the costs and benefits are to be realised;
difficulties in selecting the appropriate discount rate
(particularly if the project in question does not have
a physical or economic service life); difficulties in
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5As discussed in the fourth section of this paper, empirical-
archival analyses of the effects of accounting standards rely on
outcomes data. These ex post analyses can be viewed as
applying some of the ideas of a conventional cost benefit
analysis in an after-the-fact context.
6 I do not attempt to survey the voluminous literature on cost-
benefit analysis. Interested readers may find it helpful to review
Adler and Posner (2001). Examples of public-sector primers on
how to implement a cost-benefit analysis, including examples
and case studies, include Commonwealth of Australia (2006),
New Zealand Treasury (2005) and Bank of England (2006). Of
these, the Bank of England study of the application of cost-
benefit analysis to the collection of monetary and financial
statistics is perhaps most closely linked to the context of
financial reporting standard-setting.
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identifying costs and benefits, including scope (the
groups affected); and difficulties in assigning
monetary values to costs and benefits. Of these
four sources of difficulties, the latter two appear
to be the most discussed by financial reporting
standard-setters. The complexity and subjectivity of
a cost-benefit analysis increase as the benefits or the
costs, or both, become more intangible and quali-
tative, and less amenable to direct measurement
from market transactions. Examples of qualitative
benefits in a public policy context might include
taxpayer satisfaction from the installation of a
system to support electronic filing of tax documents
and citizen satisfaction from the ability to view
beautiful scenery without obstructions.
Cost benefit analysis uses both revealed prefer-
ence techniques (based on transactions amounts)
and stated preference techniques (based on oral or
written statements) to analyse these types of costs
and benefits. A revealed preference method com-
pares prices paid for goods and services with and
without the cost or benefit being analysed to assign
a monetary value to that cost or benefit. For
example, to estimate the benefit of being in a
good school district or the costs of being in an
airport flight path, it is possible to evaluate and
compare the selling prices of two otherwise similar
houses in two school districts with demonstrably
different quality and two otherwise similar houses
except that one is in the flight path and the other is
not. A stated preference method asks respondents
for their views (preferences or perceptions) or
perhaps asks them to assign a monetary value to a
cost or benefit but does not require any action on
their part.7
Using the results of a cost-benefit analysis to
reach a public policy decision can be further
complicated by the presence of deadweight losses,
distributional effects and behavioural effects. For
example, taxing one group to pay a subsidy to
another group is cost-benefit neutral; it has a zero
direct cost or benefit because the cost to the taxed
group is exactly equal to the benefit to the
subsidised group. However, there are at least three
complications. First, the cost of administering the
tax-and-subsidy project is a deadweight loss (a cost
that is incurred if the project is undertaken and
avoided if the project is rejected). Second, the tax-
and-subsidy project has clear winners and losers,
raising distributional and equity considerations.
These considerations lie outside a conventional
cost-benefit analysis because that analysis considers
only the net cost or net benefit and not who bears the
cost and receives the benefit. However, public
policy (for example, political) considerations might
weight the losses of the taxed group more or less
heavily than the gains of the subsidised group – a
consideration that can lead to selecting a net cost
project or rejecting a net benefit project on distri-
butional grounds. Third, the imposition of taxes and
subsidies on two distinct groups will surely affect
the economic behaviours of both groups, with
potentially significant effects.
To summarise, cost benefit analysis is a decision
tool commonly associated with public sector project
evaluation. Like a capital budgeting technique in a
profit-seeking context, it is inherently ex ante, in the
sense that it is based on expectations of costs to be
incurred and benefits to be realised over the life of a
difficult-to-reverse project; it is undertaken before a
project is approved (an ex post cost-benefit analysis
would be based on realisations of cost and benefits,
not expectations). It considers monetary values of
costs and benefits, sometimes using indirect
methods such as revealed preferences and stated
preferences to assign monetary amounts to intan-
gible and qualitative costs and benefits. It places the
costs and benefits on a comparable basis by
discounting the monetary amounts at an appropriate
discount rate. Cost benefit analysis does not include
equity or distributional effects; that is, it does not
distinguish the parties that bear the costs from the
parties that receive the benefits. Complications arise
when it is not possible to quantify costs and
benefits, when there are deadweight losses in the
form of costs that cannot be recovered and cannot
be associated with benefits, when there are sub-
stantial indirect effects that give rise to additional
costs and benefits, and when the distribution of
costs and/or benefits is important to the public
policy decision.
3. Application of cost-benefit considerations
to financial reporting standard-setting
This section begins (3.1) by considering two kinds
of groups involved in financial reporting that
undertake cost-benefit analyses of accounting
standards, starting with the standard-setters and
using the FASB and the IASB as examples. It then
describes (3.2) a second layer of cost benefit (or
economic effect) analysis, using the European
Union (EU) as an example. A recent example is
used (3.3) to describe how the IASB analyses costs
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7 For example, a person might be asked what sum of money
he would view as equivalent to being able to visit a physician
once every six months without paying for any of the visits.
Stated preferences can be problematic for a variety of reasons,
including when respondents are uncertain or unwilling to be
forthcoming about trade-offs or when the item being analysed
confers benefits or imposes costs on many, for example, the
costs and benefits of preserving forests as national parks.
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and benefits (or, to use a more recent term, effects)
of a specific standard. This section concludes (3.4)
with a discussion of the alignment between con-
ventional cost-benefit analysis and the way financial
reporting standard-setters appear to have imple-
mented this idea.
3.1. Role of the standard-setters
Cost-benefit considerations are included in the
FASB’s mission statement and its conceptual
framework and the IASB’s Framework as part of
the standard-setter’s responsibilities. In considering
its responsibility for assessing the costs and benefits
of its standards, the FASB clarified in Concepts
Statement 2, para. 144, that even if it is difficult or
impossible to make the assessment quantitatively,
‘the Board cannot cease to be concerned about the
cost-effectiveness of its standards. To do so would
be a dereliction of its duty and a disservice to its
constituents.’ Therefore, the idea of subjecting
authoritative guidance to cost-benefit consider-
ations is laid out as part of the FASB’s duties, as it
understands them. Paragraph 44 of the IASB’s
Framework, ‘Balance between benefit and cost’,
contains a discussion that is broadly consistent with
that in the FASB’s conceptual framework but much
abbreviated. In both conceptual frameworks, the
cost-benefit analysis is presented as a constraint, not
a qualitative characteristic.
The FASB’s conceptual framework contains
several discussions of costs and benefits. Concepts
Statement 1 contains the following assertion
(para. 23):
‘The information provided by financial reporting
involves a cost to provide and use, and generally
the benefits of information provided should be
expected to at least equal the cost involved. The
cost includes not only the resources directly
expended to provide the information but may
also include adverse effects on an enterprise or its
stockholders from disclosing it . . . The collect-
ive time needed to understand and use informa-
tion is also a cost . . . [T]he benefits from
financial information are usually difficult or
impossible to measure objectively, and the costs
often are; different persons will honestly disagree
about whether the benefits of the information
justify its costs.’
In addition, in the description of qualifying criteria
for financial statement recognition, Concepts
Statement 5, para. 63 specifies a ‘cost benefit
constraint’ to be imposed, in addition to several
recognition criteria, stating, ‘[T]he benefits from
recognising a particular item should justify per-
ceived costs of providing and using the informa-
tion.’8
Concepts Statement 2 addresses the difficulties
of analysing the costs and benefits of a specific
standard, stating that they ‘are both direct and
indirect, immediate and deferred. They may be
affected by a change in circumstances not foreseen
when the standard was promulgated. There are
wide variations in the estimates that different
people make about the dollar values involved
and the rate of discount to be used in reducing
them to a present value’ (para. 142). Given this
difficulty, Concepts Statement 2 proposes a quali-
tative analysis (para. 143), in three steps, as follows.
First, does the matter ‘represent a significant
[financial reporting] problem?’ Second, does a
standard ‘impose costs on the many for the benefit
of a few?’ Third, ‘there are usually alternative ways
of handling an issue. Is one of them less costly and
only slightly less effective? Even if absolute
magnitudes cannot be attached to costs and benefits,
a comparison among alternatives may yet be
possible and useful.’
It is possible to place this discussion in the
context of a conventional cost benefit analysis.
Specifically, the first criterion – the presence of a
significant financial reporting problem – conveys
the implication that the status quo is not acceptable.
That is, a decision to place a project on the standard-
setter’s agenda would seem to be an outcome of an
implicit cost-benefit analysis; the net benefit of
doing nothing is outweighed by the net benefit of
promulgating new guidance.9 The FASB’s mission
statement (available at www.fasb.org) states that
one consideration in adding a project to its agenda is
‘pervasiveness of the issue – the extent to which an
issue is troublesome to users, preparers, auditors or
others; the extent to which there is diversity of
practice; and the likely duration of the issue (i.e.
whether transitory or likely to persist).’ That is, the
FASB (or, more recently, its chairman) considers
whether the status quo imposes a cost – described in
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8 Thus, costs and benefits of accounting standards are
included as a constraint and not as qualitative characteristics,
for example, relevance and reliability. The purpose of discuss-
ing costs and benefits is to establish that the standard-setter
should consider whether the benefits arising from a given
standard justify the costs associated with that standard.
9 As discussed later, the incremental out-of-pocket cost of
developing a single new standard would be zero as long as the
work could be completed with resources in place. There would
be a potential opportunity cost, if some combination of time and
money constraints preclude a standard-setter from undertaking
an otherwise desirable project. I thank Stephen Zeff for pointing
this out to me.
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terms of the issue being pervasively troublesome –
and whether that cost is transitory.
The second criterion seems to pertain to distri-
butional effects (who bears the costs and who reaps
the benefits of financial reporting changes).
Distributional effects are not part of a conventional
cost-benefit analysis, although a reading of com-
ment letters to the FASB and IASB suggests that
they are very much in the minds of preparers,
auditors, analysts/users and others with an interest
in financial reporting standards. Based on the
information in the basis for conclusions sections
of recent standards issued by the IASB and FASB
that describe standard-setter redeliberations of pro-
posed standards in light of issues raised in comment
letters, it does not appear that the IASB and FASB
believe it is practicable to measure (quantify) the
distributional effects of a given proposed standard –
the discussions are largely, if not wholly, qualita-
tive. Likewise, the information in the basis for
conclusions does not provide systematic evidence
that the IASB and FASB believe that distributional
effects on one group (for example, preparers)
should systematically receive greater weight, less
weight, or equal weight as compared to effects on
any other group.10
The third criterion of the cost-benefit discussion
in Concepts Statement 2 pertains directly to
seeking a cost-effective alternative, even if the
analysis of costs and effects must be qualitative.
Observation of the due process procedures of the
IASB and FASB suggests that this criterion is
applied continually during the standard-setting
process, including seeking input from constituents
about anticipated costs of various alternatives, and
also after a standard has been promulgated,
including deferring an effective date. This iterative
process suggests that the standard-setter continues
to receive information about the cost of applying a
standard both while the provisions are being
deliberated and after the standard-setter has
reached a decision.11
The FASB and IASB have retained the idea of a
cost benefit constraint in the due process documents
issued as part of their joint project to complete,
improve and converge their conceptual frame-
works. Those documents recast the constraints on
financial reporting as materiality and cost; the
discussion of benefit is embedded in the discussion
of cost and does not receive separate treatment. The
exposure draft Conceptual Framework for
Financial Reporting: The Objective of Financial
Reporting and Qualitative Characteristics and
Constraints of Decision-Useful Financial
Reporting Information (29 May 2008; hereinafter
the conceptual framework exposure draft) con-
cludes that any cost-benefit analysis will usually be
more qualitative than quantitative, acknowledges
that the analysis often will be incomplete, and lists
specific examples of both costs and benefits
(para. QC29–QC33). The exposure draft lists as
information provision costs the costs of collecting,
processing, verification and dissemination and
notes that preparers expend most of the efforts of
information provision while the costs are born by
capital providers. The exposure draft also lists, for
users, costs of analysing and interpreting (that is,
using) information and costs associated with
incomplete information in financial reports. In
terms of benefits, the exposure draft suggests that:
‘Financial reporting information helps capital
providers make better decisions, which results in
more efficient functioning of capital markets and
a lower cost of capital for the economy as a
whole. Individual entities also enjoy benefits,
including improved access to capital markets,
favourable effect on public relations, and perhaps
lower costs of capital. The benefits may also
include better management decisions because
financial information used internally often is
based at least partly on information prepared for
general purpose financial reporting purposes’
(para. QC31).
This discussion points toward an empirical
measure of the benefits of a change in financial
reporting standards, specifically, a decrease in the
cost of capital. I return to this idea later on in this
paper.
3.2. Cost-benefit analyses in the EU
Although both the FASB and the IASB understand
cost-benefit analysis to be part of their responsibil-
ities, we might ask why an independent private
sector standard-setter that is not a regulatory body
would not leave most or even all considerations of
costs and benefits to securities regulators or other
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10 It is, of course, an empirical question whether the views of
some group of constituents regularly prevail and, if they do,
whether this is because of the technical merits of that group’s
input, or because of an implicit and perhaps even unconscious
weight attached to distributional effects for that group, or for
some other reason. This question belongs to the politics of
standard-setting, a topic that lies outside the scope of this
discussion paper.
11 For example, the FASB provided for two one-year
deferrals, applicable to non-public entities, of the effective
date of Interpretation 48, Accounting for Uncertainty in Income
Taxes, 2006, now part of Accounting Standards Codification
(ASC) Topic 740. Cost-based delays occur in other settings, as
evidenced by the repeated deferrals of certain provisions of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, s. 404, applicable to certain smaller SEC
registrants.
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government agencies, who represent a public policy
interest.12 For example, a securities regulator could
perform its own cost-benefit analysis of each
standard and could decline to enforce any authori-
tative financial reporting guidance that did not meet
its cost-benefit threshold. The EU appears to have
adopted a policy along these lines, as described
next.
The EU has adopted a policy and procedures for
standard-by-standard consideration and possible
endorsement for the guidance issued by the IASB.
After the IASB has issued a standard (including its
own analysis of costs and benefits), the European
Financial Reporting Advisory Group (EFRAG)
provides both advice as to whether the standard
meets established criteria, including understand-
ability, relevance, reliability, comparability, condu-
cive to the European public good and an economic
effects analysis. This is a separate analysis, not a
review of the IASB’s analysis.13 Then the Standards
Advice Review Group (SARG) provides an opinion
on the EFRAG advice, followed by recommenda-
tions and ultimately votes by, among others, the
Accounting Regulatory Committee of the EC.14
The European Parliament and the Council of the EU
can object to an adoption decision but have a limited
time to do so. This portion of the endorsement
process is shown in the following diagram:15
Given this elaborate multi-step, multi-party
analysis, why does it make sense for the IASB to
do its own cost-benefit analysis? Why not leave the
entire effort to the EC and comparable bodies in the
other jurisdictions where IFRS (or standards based
on or adapted from IFRS) are used? It would seem
that such an approach would reduce the cost of
standard-setting by eliminating one step in the
process. I suggest that an analysis of these questions
should include the following considerations. First,
what group is best equipped, in terms of skills and
subject-matter knowledge, to consider the costs and
benefits of a given financial reporting standard?
Second, what group has the greatest incentive and
greatest ability to be objective in its analysis? Third,
to what extent is a standard-by-standard analysis by
a governmental body detrimental to the independ-
ence of the standard-setter? Fourth, and related to
the issue of independence, to what extent is a
standard-by-standard analysis by a governmental
body, followed by a standard-by-standard decision
as to whether to require the use of the standard,
detrimental to the quality of financial reporting
standards? Fifth, what are the advantages and
disadvantages of a system in which a governmental
body (for example, a securities regulator) recog-
nises or endorses the standard-setter, as opposed to
each of its standards?
3.3. Cost-benefit example: IFRS 3
The FASB and IASB include explicit discussions of
costs and benefits in their recent standards. This
subsection describes the benefits and costs discus-
sion in IFRS 3, Business Combinations,16 selected
because it was recently issued, it represents the
culmination of the first major joint convergence
project of the FASB and IASB, and it illustrates how
the IASB currently thinks about costs and benefits.
The benefits and costs discussion of IFRS 3
begins (para. BC 435) with a statement of the
objective of financial statements and states the
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12 I view the distinction between a standard-setting body and
a regulator as important. Only the latter has enforcement
powers. In some cases, both financial reporting standard-setting
and securities regulation (enforcement) are carried out by the
same group, for example, a Ministry of Finance; however, this is
not the case for the FASB and the IASB.
13 Reviews (or audits) of cost-benefit analyses, as opposed to
undertaking a second cost-benefit analysis, may be part of an
overall public-policy-decision-making apparatus. For example,
the US Government Accountability Office (GAO) reviews and
comments on the cost-benefit analyses of certain government
regulatory bodies if asked to do so by members of the US
Congress. See, for example, the GAO’s Clean Air Act:
Observations on EPA’s Cost-Benefit Analysis of Its Mercury
Control Options (GAO, 2005). This study did not independently
estimate the costs and benefits of the options the EPA
(Environmental Protection Agency) considered; rather, it
reviewed the quality of the cost-benefit analysis process and
offered a series of criticisms of that process, including non-
comparable estimates, failure to estimate health benefits asso-
ciated with decreased mercury emissions and failure to analyse
key uncertainties.
14 The EC’s analysis of IFRS 9, issued November 2009,
suggests that the EC takes seriously the task of reconsidering
IFRSs on a standard-by-standard basis and does not feel the
need to defer to the IASB. In a letter to Sir David Tweedie,
Chairman of the IASB, dated 11 November 2009, Jorgen
Holmquist, speaking for the EC, suggested that IFRS 9 did not
reach ‘the right balance on fair value accounting and possible
impact on financial stability.’
15 This diagram and the related description are downloaded
from the EU’s website: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/
accounting/docs/ias/endorsement_process.pdf.
16 The IASB has also issued a document Business
Combinations Phase II: Project summary, feedback and effect
analysis, January 2008 that elaborates on most of the cost and
benefit ideas discussed in the standard.
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criterion that the benefits derived from information
should exceed the costs of providing it, along with
two qualifying statements: (1) the evaluation of
benefits and costs is essentially a judgmental
process; and (2) costs and benefits may be borne
by different groups. In reaching its judgment, the
IASB considers the costs incurred by preparers of
financial statements and their comparative advan-
tage in developing information relative to the costs
users would incur to develop substitutes for missing
information; the costs incurred by users of financial
statements when information is not available; the
benefit of better decision-making as a result of
improved financial reporting. The IASB concluded
that the revised IFRS 3 confers benefits by
‘converging to common high quality, understand-
able and enforceable accounting standards for
business combinations in IFRSs and US GAAP.
This improves the comparability of financial infor-
mation around the world and it also simplifies and
reduces the costs of accounting for entities that issue
financial statements in accordance with both IFRSs
and US GAAP’ (para. BC436). As I read this
statement, the IASB identifies two benefits: (1) a
converged standard that increases comparability
among entities that apply IFRS and USGAAP; (2) a
standard that is high quality, understandable and
enforceable. I interpret the second benefit as
encompassing both quality of the standard, pre-
sumably captured by its ability to produce decision-
useful information when properly implemented,
and implementation, presumably captured by
understandability and enforceability.
The remainder of the discussion refers to specific
aspects of IFRS 3, including, for example, scope,
non-controlling interest, contingent consideration
and exceptions to the requirement to measure all
assets and liabilities of the acquired firm at fair
value. In this discussion, the IASB refers to benefits
in the form of understandability, relevance, reliabil-
ity and comparability of information provided; in
the discussion of fair value remeasurement of
contingent consideration the IASB refers to state-
ments by financial statement users that suggest a
perception on the part of those users that the
remeasurement requirement would increase the
timeliness of information.17 The discussion of
costs describes preparation costs, including obtain-
ing external valuations, audit costs and ‘complex-
ities’ of certain fair value measurements.
To summarise, the IASB’s recent discussion of
costs and benefits of IFRS 3 is entirely qualitative, is
couched in terms of qualitative characteristics from
conceptual frameworks (for example, relevance,
reliability and comparability) and notes that costs
and benefits may be borne by different groups.
Taking the discussion of IFRS 3 as a representative
example of a financial reporting standard cost-
benefit analysis, the next subsection discusses the
alignment between this approach and a conven-
tional cost-benefit analysis.
3.4. Alignment between a standard-setting
discussion and a conventional cost benefit analysis
As previously discussed, a conventional cost benefit
analysis has the following components: (1) a time
period over which future costs and benefits are
estimated; (2) consideration of the costs and
benefits of each alternative, including the status
quo; (3) assignment of monetary values to costs and
benefits; (4) a discount rate to place all monetary
values on a comparable basis. The discussion of
costs and benefits from IFRS 3 does not specify a
time period, discusses the costs and benefits of the
status quo (not issuing a revised IFRS 3) primarily
by implication, and does not assignmonetary values
to either costs or benefits. This qualitative approach
is consistent with the view that a quantitative
approach to cost-benefit analysis of financial
reporting standards is impracticable, particularly
with regard to benefits. Under this view, a conven-
tional cost-benefit analysis would not be applicable
to financial reporting standard-setting.
If this conclusion is accepted, standard-setters
might consider whether it would be helpful to
acknowledge that a conventional cost-benefit analy-
sis cannot, as a practical matter, be applied to
financial reporting standards, and to discontinue the
use of language that suggests such an analysis can
be done and should be done. A change in termin-
ology, from ‘costs and benefits’ to ‘effects’ or
‘impacts’ may result in a better description of the
cognitive process actually used by standard-setters
to weigh the consequences of changing authorita-
tive guidance. That is, the standard-setter considers
whether a standard will lead to improvements in
financial reporting at a reasonable cost. Under this
approach, I suggest that the standard-setter could
consider the following: abandon the potentially
misleading terms ‘costs and benefits’ and continue
the current practice of describing how the standard’s
provisions, when implemented in a way that is
consistent with the objective of the standard, will
achieve the desired level of improved financial
reporting by yielding financial reports the contents
of which mesh with the qualitative characteristics of
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17 Specifically, para. BC437(c) states that users ‘have stated
that the information they receive under [the predecessor
standard] is too late to be useful.’
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financial reporting (relevance, reliability and com-
parability), and explaining the approaches taken to
reduce the costs to preparers and, if applicable,
auditors.18 The standard-setter would take as its
goal the improvement of financial reporting as
measured by the qualitative characteristics, subject
to reducing implementation and assurance costs
where it makes sense to do so, and would not make
an attempt to compare or trade off the benefits to one
group against the costs to another group.
Alternatively, standard-setters could re-examine
the view that it is not practicable to apply quanti-
tative techniques of cost-benefit analysis to finan-
cial reporting standards. Under this approach,
standard-setters would thoroughly reconsider the
practicability of obtaining data to form quantitative
measures, however uncertain, of the costs and
benefits of a given reporting standard, and how best
to go about that task. After this reconsideration,
standard-setters, and their constituents, would con-
clude that obtaining quantitative measures is worth
the cost, in terms of improving financial reporting
standard-setting, or that it is not.19 The next section
explores this idea in more detail and provides some
examples from accounting research.
4. Possible approaches to analysing effects of
a given change in accounting standards
The possibility of a substantial and intractable
misalignment between a conventional cost-benefit
analysis and the way standard-setters actually
analyse the costs and benefits of accounting stand-
ards, as well as the notion that it may make sense to
abandon the idea of comparing costs with benefits
altogether (or at least, abandon the use of termin-
ology suggesting that such a comparison has been
made), raises the question of what are the practical
limits of capturing the effects (both costs and
benefits) of a given accounting standard, or a set of
accounting standards. This section considers this
issue from several perspectives, moving from a
consideration of costs (4.1) to benefits (4.2),
attributes of accounting information (4.3) and
market outcomes (4.4). It concludes with examples
of accounting research (4.5).
4.1 Analysing the costs of a change in accounting
standards
In this subsection, I consider which costs are
relevant to the analysis of a given change in
accounting standards, suggest that, in general,
gathering reliable data on many of these costs is
impracticable or close to it, and distinguish costs
from consequences. I also offer a comment on the
distribution of costs, in the context of a conven-
tional cost-benefit analysis.
Which costs are relevant?
A conventional cost benefit analysis requires the
identification of all costs that would be incurred or
avoided by an alternative that is being considered.
Viewed from this perspective, the operating cost of
the standard-setter (that is, the size of the standard-
setter’s budget) would in general not be pertinent to
the evaluation of any given standard. The reason is
that the standard-setter’s total cost is fixed within a
relevant range of standard-setting activities; it is
sunk with respect to the issuance of an incremental
standard. That is, the standard-setter’s operating
budget is a cost of having standards in general, not a
cost of issuing a specific standard. There may be an
opportunity cost if the standard-setter is precluded
by limits of time or money or both from undertaking
all meritorious projects; or, alternatively, there may
be an out-of-pocket cost if the addition of a
standard-setting project necessitates hiring of pro-
fessional staff.
In addition, it is only the incremental costs of
applying a new standard (for preparers) and the non-
recoverable incremental costs of assurance (for
auditors) and of using the new information (for
analyst/users) that are pertinent to the net cost of
that standard. A cost incurred by an auditor or
analyst/user that is passed along to a preparer and
included in the preparer’s cost to apply the standard
would not be a net cost of applying a new standard.
Those application costs would include the incre-
mental out-of-pocket costs to change information
systems (preparers and possibly auditors) and to
change models used for analysis, prediction and
valuation (users and possibly auditors) as well as
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18My emphasis is on calibrating the provisions of a standard
in terms of their ability to produce relevant, reliable and
comparable information when properly applied—an effects
analysis. However, in its January 2008 report, Business
Combinations Phase II, Project summary, feedback and effect
analysis (hereinafter, the IASB effect analysis) the IASB
appears to distinguish between a cost-benefit evaluation and
an effects analysis. As I interpret the report, the effect analysis
appears to focus on how financial statement information will
change, in terms of measurement and available information, and
the cost-benefit analysis appears to focus on preparation and
information analysis costs.
19Meeks and Meeks (2001: 43) provide several quotes that
espouse the importance of cost-benefit analyses in financial
reporting standards specifically and accounting regulation more
generally, and end with the following hopeful comment and
question: ‘ . . . although the conceptual and measurement diffi-
culties are challenging, each category of cost and benefit is
actually amenable to research, research which in some cases
could yield fairly precise estimates while in others it should at
least significantly narrow the range of possibilities . . . Is it
unreasonable to conjecture that the benefits of such research
would exceed its costs?’
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ongoing incremental costs of continuing to apply
the new standard. It is an open question as to the
time period that should be associated with these
costs.
The size and nature (e.g. one-time versus
ongoing) of these costs will vary considerably
across standards and possibly across reporting
entities. In principle, it would be possible to elicit
preparer, auditor and analyst/user estimates of these
costs, both at adoption and ongoing. Techniques
such as stratified (by industry and size) random
sampling would support extrapolation of preparer
costs and auditor costs from fairly limited samples.
The incremental costs to analyst/users could, in
principle, be elicited the same way, by asking a
sample of analysts/users to report on the incremen-
tal costs to change their models because of a new
standard. However, developing the cost data would
itself involve a cost and the resulting estimates
would be inaccurate because of sampling error and
because of respondent estimation error. In addition,
the standard-setter has no way to compel anyone to
provide this type of information.
Finally, the cost of learning a new standard falls
on preparers, auditors and users, all of whom need
to exert the cognitive effort, and devote the time, to
understand the requirements and implications of
that standard. The time required represents an
opportunity cost – the learner must forgo either
leisure or productive activities (if the latter, this cost
belongs to the learner’s employer). Learning costs
would be expected to increase with the complexity
of both the standard and the measurement required
by the standard. Time and cognitive effort devoted
to this learning process have an opportunity cost
that in principle might be elicited by using a
revealed preference or stated preference technique.
One idea would be to ask preparers or analysts/users
what is the cash equivalent value of a standard that
can be applied with no additional learning versus
one that requires a specified amount of learning; the
difficulty would be holding constant the other
attributes of the standard and holding constant the
cost of obtaining information to apply the standard.
Developing the survey instrument would itself
require substantial standard-setter effort, including
possibly devising a mechanism for obtaining
revealed preferences.
Distinguishing consequences from costs
An analysis of the costs and benefits of a change in
financial reporting standards should distinguish
between costs and consequences. Changes in
financial reporting standards should be expected
to have consequences for decisions that are predi-
cated on judgments or estimates that are based on
financial reporting information, for example,
assessments of enterprise risk or earning capacity.
Investors and creditors may revise their estimates of
required return in light of new information made
available because of a change in accounting stand-
ards; this consequence of the change would be
regarded as an overall benefit to the extent that the
result is a more efficient allocation of capital in the
economy.
Recent FASB standards that eliminate the
Qualifying Special Purpose Entity (QSPE) excep-
tion20 and require a largely qualitative analysis of
variable interest entities provide a current example
of consequences of changes in financial reporting
standards.21 The changes, effective from January
2010, are expected to require certain firms, includ-
ing, in particular, certain financial services firms, to
recognise previously off-balance sheet assets and
liabilities associated with certain securitisation
activities. The accounting standards do not affect
the economic substance (risks and benefits) of the
assets and liabilities arising in securitisation struc-
tures, but they will in some cases require the balance
sheet recognition of those assets and liabilities – a
change in information provided, not a change in the
risk and pay-off structure of the entity. That is, the
securitisation arrangements exist and have done so
for some time; the difference for analysts/users lies
in the ease of accessing accounting measures of
those structures. The consequence of this change in
standards, that some would characterise as a benefit
of the change, is that investors, creditors, and bank
regulators will, after the effective date of the
standards, have ready access, through the financial
reporting system, to more nearly complete infor-
mation about assets and liabilities associated with
securitisation activities. Bank regulators can choose
to use this information in setting regulatory capital
requirements, or they can choose to disregard it.
The American Bankers Association (ABA) has
requested that bank regulators provide a lengthy
transition period (at least three years) before fully
using this additional information in setting bank
capital requirements, and when the information is
used, regulators should take account of arrange-
ments that would be expected to affect the risk of the
consolidated assets, such as buying credit protec-
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20A QSPE was exempt from consolidation, based on the
reasoning that the entity is so entirely passive that control could
not be at issue.
21 SFAS 166, Accounting for Transfers of Financial Assets,
an Amendment to FASB Statement No. 140 (2009), now part of
Accounting Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 860 and SFAS
167, Amendment to FASB Interpretation No. 46(R) (2009), now
part of ASC Topic 810.
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tion.22 In making these requests, the ABA points to
costs in the form of reduced lending and loss of
competitive position for US banks if bank regula-
tors immediately use the new information without
adjustment. Thus, the consequence of the change in
accounting standards is the provision of more
information about the assets and liabilities associ-
ated with entities’ securitisation activities. An
alleged potential cost that might be imposed on
certain regulated entities involves the use, by
regulators, of this information to constrain those
entities’ lending activities and perhaps their other
activities as well.23 However, that cost is not a cost
of the standard.
The focus on consequences and their link (and,
sometimes, their conflating) with costs was
described over 30 years ago by Zeff (1978) who
described ‘economic consequences’ as the ‘impact
of accounting reports on the decision-making
behaviour of business, government, unions, invest-
ors and creditors. It is argued that the resulting
behaviour of these individuals and groups could be
detrimental to the interests of other affected parties.
And, the argument goes, accounting standard-
setters must take into consideration these allegedly
detrimental consequences when deciding on
accounting questions’ (Zeff, 1978: 56). He illus-
trates this issue with examples beginning in 1941,
demonstrating that this way of thinking about
consequences as costs is not new. Similarly, Oscar
Gellein (FASB Special Report, 1991: 87–95) makes
the point that the provision of neutral,24 decision-
useful information has consequences, noting,
‘Financial reporting would be sterile and standards
setting would be purposeless if nothing resulted
from the reporting . . . At the highest level or
purpose, financial reporting should be useful in
bringing about efficient allocation of available
resources.’ (p. 88). In other words, financial report-
ing information should be one of the inputs used by
investors and creditors in making decisions about
where to invest and where to lend – it is a signal for
capital allocation.
Distribution of costs
Although the distribution of costs (specifically,
which party bears them) is not part of a conven-
tional cost-benefit analysis, discussions of costs of
accounting standards sometimes imply that the
costs are incurred by preparers and the benefits are
received by analysts/investors, and that this distri-
butional effect is pertinent to standard-setting. For
example, the IASB’s effect analysis contains the
following language:
‘Who bears the costs is important. For example,
an acquirer might choose to measure non-
controlling interests at their proportionate inter-
ests in the net identifiable assets of the acquired
business, rather than at fair value. If analysts want
to use the fair value of the non-controlling
interests in a valuation, for example, each analyst
will incur costs estimating that fair value.
Allowing a lower cost option for preparers can
shift the costs to analysts and other users –
assuming, in this example, that the analyst prefers
to measure non-controlling interests at fair value.
It is also likely that the estimate of fair value
made by each analyst will be less reliable than the
estimate made by the acquirer . . . If the analyst
prefers to measure non-controlling interests at
their proportionate interest in the subsidiary, then
requiring them to be measured at fair value
imposes a cost on the preparer with no benefit to
the users’ (p. 13).
Viewing this discussion as a representative
example, I offer the following observations. First,
a conventional cost-benefit analysis would study
costs and benefits, not which party incurs the costs
and which receives the benefits. Second, a discus-
sion of the distribution of costs should be precise as
to what is meant by the word ‘preparer’. On the one
hand, preparers are persons who are paid to be
expert in transactions and financial reporting, and to
exert effort to prepare financial reports. Under the
assumption that preparers (an entity’s accounting
staff, controller and CFO, for example) are paid a
market wage for their efforts, including their
cognitive efforts to understand a new accounting
standard and how to apply it, they do not incur
additional costs from a change in accounting
standards. On the other hand, ‘preparer’ may refer
to the owners of the reporting entity, who incur the
incremental out-of-pocket costs of changes in
accounting standards, including, for example, the
costs of new information systems, the costs of
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22 Letter dated 15 October 2009 from Michael L. Gullette to
the Controller of the Currency, the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation and
the Office of Thrift Supervision.
23 As previously noted, the regulator can choose to disregard
the financial accounting information. It could also have imposed
a regulatory reporting requirement and regime, in the absence of
any financial reporting requirement, that would have had the
same effect as basing regulatory behaviour on the FASB’s recent
standards.
24 Gellein uses the word ‘evenhanded’ to describe neutrality
and notes that ‘Evenhandedness has been achieved if enterprises
can expect to pay a price for capital that is commensurate with
prospective return and assumed risk.’ This points toward a focus
on the cost of capital and changes therein as an indicator of the
effects of changes in financial reporting standards.
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training the accounting staff and, possibly, the costs
of hiring more accounting professionals.25 Also, as
discussed in the next section, if a change in
accounting standards confers capital market bene-
fits, those benefits would reasonably be expected to
devolve to owners.
The cost of obtaining cost data
I argue that at least some of the costs of a given
change in accounting standards could, in principle,
be ascertained by using survey methods and
revealed preference and stated preference tech-
niques. However, such an approach would itself
impose costs on the financial reporting system every
time there is an actual or proposed change in
standards. Those costs would include the personnel
and other costs of devising and administering the
instruments and compiling and analysing the
resulting data plus the costs to respondents of
developing their responses. A potentially significant
cost that, in my view, defies quantification is the
cost of compelling or inducing those surveyed to
respond.
To provide a sense of how one government
agency went about obtaining cost data using a
survey instrument, see Securities and Exchange
Commission, 2009. This is an example of an ex post
analysis, based on a survey undertaken during late
2008–early 2009 by the Office of Economic
Analysis (OEA, 2009) of the US Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) of the costs and
benefits of the requirement, imposed by s. 404 of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 and modified by SEC
guidance issued in 2007, that the independent
auditor attest to management’s assessment of the
effectiveness of internal controls over financial
reporting.26 To obtain a sense of what might be
involved in obtaining survey-based cost data for a
complicated standard, it is instructive to consider
the length of the report – 139 pages – and the efforts
involved, including designing a web-based survey,
identifying the recipients of the survey, asking them
to participate (and following up), collecting and
analysing the data. The list of caveats and caution-
ary language about the results and their interpret-
ability runs to five pages. I view this report as
providing a potentially useful example of both what
can be done in terms of gathering survey data and
what kind of effort is required.
4.2. Analysing the benefits of a change in
accounting standards
Standard-setters such as the FASB and IASB
emphasise the difficulties in quantifying the benefits
of accounting standards and suggest that the
evaluation of benefits is necessarily qualitative.
For example, the IASB’s 2008 effect analysis
contains the following discussion:
‘Our evaluations of costs and benefits are neces-
sarily qualitative, rather than quantitative. This is
because quantifying costs, and, particularly,
benefits is inherently difficult. Although other
standard-setters undertake similar types of analy-
sis, there is a lack of sufficiently well-established
and reliable techniques for quantifying this
analysis.’
To guide standard-setters’ thinking, the FASB’s
conceptual framework and the IASB’s Framework
point to increases in decision-usefulness, described
in terms of relevance, reliability and comparability,
as the benefits of accounting standards.
‘Relevance’ implies the ability to affect a resource
allocation decision, generally a credit granting or
equity investing decision. The decision context
provides the boundaries of usefulness as those
items that are pertinent to lending or investing in
equity instruments. This criterion, taken in isol-
ation, would not be very restrictive; an airline’s
load factor or a homebuilder’s order backlog
would be relevant to a profit analysis.
Furthermore, the relevance criterion does not
lend itself to quantification; for example, it does
not specify how much a given decision would
have to be potentially affected by a given item and
whether some decisions are more important than
others, in terms of supplying relevant information.
‘Reliability’ implies that the reported item corres-
ponds to what it purports to represent. The
assessment of reliability is complicated by: (1) a
dearth of objective benchmarks against which to
calibrate a given reported item; and (2) even given
a benchmark, a lack of agreement on what would
constitute the admissible level of unreliability, that
is the admissible size of the confidence interval
around the reported number. In addition, the
development of benchmarks and measures of
acceptable amounts of unreliability would still
not provide evidence on how to make an
unacceptably unreliable number acceptably reli-
able, including the cost of doing so.
‘Comparability’ means that similar items are
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25 This point is made in the conceptual framework exposure
draft, para. QC30: ‘Preparers expend the majority of the effort
toward providing financial information. However, capital
providers ultimately bear the cost of those efforts in the form
of reduced returns.’
26 The primary focus of the SEC survey was the effect of the
2007 reforms on the cost-effectiveness of evaluations of internal
controls over financial reporting and related audits.
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accounted for the same way and different items are
accounted for differently. Any standard that con-
tains a free choice in the accounting for a given
item, whether implicit or explicit, impairs compar-
ability. IASB and FASB discussions suggest that
analysts/users bear the costs of non-comparability,
because they incur costs to adjust reported num-
bers to the extent such adjustments are practicable.
Qualitative characteristics from the FASB’s and
IASB’s conceptual frameworks do not necessarily
readily link to empirical measures used by account-
ing researchers. For example, the concepts state-
ment exposure draft (para. BC2.8–2.10)
distinguishes between predictive value (accounting
information can be used to make assessments of
outcomes before those outcomes occur) and pre-
dictability (a statistical notion that pertains to
forecast accuracy) and notes that the IASB and
FASB do not believe it is appropriate to adopt
statistical notions in the framework. However,
accounting researchers sometimes explicitly focus
on forecast accuracy as an outcome indicator in
their examinations of financial reporting outcomes.
Although there is sometimes a possible misalign-
ment between the qualitative characteristics and
research-based measures, accounting researchers
have sometimes attempted to motivate their analy-
ses of effects of financial reporting and changes in
reporting requirements in terms of the conceptual
framework. The next two sections discuss two
approaches, based on attributes of accounting
information and on market outcomes, such as
indicators of the ex ante cost of capital.
4.3. Attributes of accounting information
Accounting researchers commonly focus on sum-
mary indicators such as earnings and book values in
their empirical analyses of accounting information
and calculate attributes or characteristics of these
summary indicators. In this discussion, I identify
three categories of attributes of accounting infor-
mation: market-based, accounting-based and ana-
lyst-based.27 Market-based attributes take prices or
returns as the reference construct and calculate an
earnings or book value attribute based on an
estimated association between accounting earnings
or book value and either prices or returns.
Accounting-based attributes take cash or earnings
as the reference construct and calculate an earnings
attribute based on the relations among earnings
numbers over a period of time (for example,
persistence, predictability) or the relation between
earnings and cash flows (for example, smoothness,
accruals quality as described by Dechow and
Dichev, 2002). Analyst-based attributes are based
on the properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts,
including bias, dispersion and accuracy.
Market-based attributes are grounded in the
statistical association between prices or returns
(usually equity prices or returns) and accounting
amounts, as measured by regressions of prices or
returns on accounting numbers. The explanatory
power of such regressions is sometimes interpreted
as capturing the combined qualitative characteris-
tics relevance and reliability (for example, Barth et
al., 2001). One variant of this approach regresses
earnings on returns (for example, Ball et al., 2000)
and is used to capture timeliness and conservatism
(described as the ability of earnings to capture the
information that is already in returns, particularly, in
the case of conservatism, the negative informa-
tion).28 Another variant focuses on the slope
coefficients, not the explanatory power, of regres-
sions of returns or prices on earnings and (some-
times) book values or reverse regressions of
earnings on returns.29
The association between market outcomes and
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27 This discussion follows from a portion of the discussion in
Francis et al. (2004). I provide examples of accounting attributes
that have been examined in accounting research; I do not
attempt to identify and discuss all the attributes of accounting
information that researchers have considered.
28 Accounting researchers differ in their views about the
meaning and importance of conservatism, and some accounting
researchers take issue with what they see as standard-setters’
apparent disregard for the value of conservatism in financial
reporting. See, for example, Watts (2003) for a discussion of
conservatism, including a description of conservatism as more
stringent verification requirements for income-increasing items
than for income-decreasing items, and arguments suggesting
that conservatism is a key element of accounting quality. The
FASB’s Concepts Statement 2, Qualitative Characteristics of
Accounting Information, 1980, para. 95, describes conservatism
as ‘a prudent reaction to uncertainty to try to ensure that
uncertainties and risks inherent in business situations are
adequately considered’ but does not include conservatism as a
qualitative characteristic. The IASB’s Framework, para. 37,
describes prudence as ‘the inclusion of a degree of caution in the
exercise of the judgements needed in making the estimates
required under conditions of uncertainty, such that assets or
income are not overstated and liabilities and expenses are not
understated’ and includes prudence as a qualitative character-
istic. The conceptual framework exposure draft states that
‘describing prudence or conservatism as a qualitative charac-
teristic or a desirable response to uncertainty would conflict with
the quality of neutrality because . . . an admonition to be
prudent is likely to lead to a bias in the reported financial
position and financial performance’ (para. BC2.21, emphasis in
original). To use the language of the conceptual framework, the
question of the value of conservatism in financial reporting
seems to turn on whether conservatism increases the decision-
usefulness of reported information; some accounting research-
ers argue, and present evidence, that it would.
29 The slope coefficient from a regression of returns on
earnings is sometimes referred to as an earnings response
coefficient (ERC), for example, see Kormendi and Lipe (1987)
and Easton and Zmijewski (1989).
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accounting numbers can be measured in terms of
explanatory power (for example, of returns for
earnings or vice versa) or in terms of estimated
coefficients, over long returns windows or short,
and for various configurations of accounting infor-
mation (for example, net income versus net losses;
line items on the income statement; earnings plus
book value). In all cases, however, the reference
construct is a market outcome measure – price or
return. A standard whose application led to infor-
mation with a stronger association between an
accounting outcome and the market reference
construct would constitute an improvement; the
benefit of the standard is captured by the increase in
the measure of association, which in turn is
interpreted as capturing the increase in relevance
and reliability combined.
Accounting-based attributes are grounded in the
relation between earnings and cash (for example,
accruals quality and smoothness) or in certain
distributional properties of earnings for a large
sample (for example, a high frequency of small
positive income in a cross-sectional distribution of
reported earnings and losses is sometimes identified
as an indicator of managed earnings) or in the time-
series properties of earnings (for example, persist-
ence and predictability). In some cases, the attribute
is inherently firm-specific (for example, earnings
persistence) and in other cases the attribute appears
only in a distribution of earnings outcomes (for
example, a high frequency of small positive
incomes). Accruals quality (for example, Dechow
and Dichev, 2002) is the mapping of current
accruals into lagged, contemporaneous and leading
cash flows; smoothness (for example, Leuz et al.,
2003) is the ratio of income variability to cash flow
variability. Persistence is a measure of earnings
sustainability (for example, the slope coefficient
from a regression of current earnings on lagged
earnings) and predictability is often measured as the
ability of the current earnings number to predict the
next period’s earnings. These accounting-based
attributes have been argued to be linked to the
idea that earnings should assist in the assessment of
either future earnings or future cash flows, or both,
and that earnings management impairs that assess-
ment. Accepting that argument as valid, the appli-
cation of a standard which led to an improvement in
one of these measures would improve financial
reporting, with the amount of the benefit captured
by the amount of the measure’s improvement.
Analyst-forecast-based attributes are grounded in
the presumption that analysts’ earnings forecasts
represent a key use of accounting information (by
analysts, to form the forecasts) and a key source of
information to investors. These attributes include
accuracy, bias and dispersion (sometimes inter-
preted as an indicator of uncertainty).30 Application
of a standard which led to an increase in accuracy,
and/or a decrease in bias or dispersion would
constitute an improvement and the amount of the
benefit would be captured by the change in the
measure.
In some cases, researchers have used combin-
ations of several attributes to assess ‘accounting
quality’, a term that is discussed but not included as
a qualitative characteristic in the FASB’s and
IASB’s conceptual frameworks. Standard-setter
assessments of improvements in financial reporting
use the qualitative characteristics – relevance,
reliability, and comparability – as benchmarks of
accounting quality in qualitative assessments.31 As
previously noted, accounting researchers have
linked these qualitative characteristics to empirical
measures of certain attributes of accounting infor-
mation. For example, Barth et al. (2008) capture
accounting quality using indicators of earnings
management (smoothing and managing toward
positive income), timely loss recognition (fre-
quency of large losses, perhaps interpretable as
linked to conservatism) and value relevance (asso-
ciation between market values and both book value
of equity and earnings, sometimes interpreted as
capturing combined relevance and reliability, for
example, Barth et al., 2001).
There are several open issues related to research
that bases inferences about the effects of changes
in accounting standards on an analysis of changes
in the attributes of accounting information. First, to
what extent are the attribute measures interrelated?
For example, Barth et al. (2008) and others have
noted that the accelerated loss recognition associ-
ated with requirements to recognise asset impair-
ments before the losses are realised is likely to be
associated with more volatile (less smooth) earn-
ings and possibly lower earnings persistence.
Second, to what extent are attributes of accounting
information innate, in the sense of being mani-
festations of the neutral application of accounting
standards to the reporting entity’s operating envir-
onment and business model, as opposed to discre-
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30 Francis et al. (2004, particularly chapter 1) provide a
detailed discussion of research on the properties of analyst
earnings forecasts and analyst forecasting behaviour.
31 The joint IASB-FASB conceptual framework exposure
draft states that ‘quality is defined by the objective and
qualitative characteristics of financial reporting information’
and ‘application of objectives and qualitative characteristics
should lead to high-quality standards, which in turn should lead
to high-quality financial reporting information that is useful for
making decisions’ (para. BC2.47, emphasis in original).
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tionary, in the sense of arising from management’s
financial reporting decisions?32 Third, none of the
commonly used attributes of accounting informa-
tion captures comparability, the idea that similar
arrangements and events are accounted for the
same way. If comparability is a fundamental
indicator of reporting quality then a standard that
eliminates alternatives for the same arrangement or
event (for example, eliminating the pooling-of-
interests method for business combinations) would
create a benefit and a standard that permits
alternatives for the same arrangement or event
(for example, a fair value option) would create a
cost.33
4.4. Market outcomes
Accounting and finance researchers, as well as
some discussions by standard-setters, point to
certain capital market outcomes as intrinsically
desirable, including liquidity and a reduced cost of
capital. Meeks andMeeks (2001: 41) list among the
benefits of accounting regulation the following
outcomes: (1) reduction of ‘shareholder losses
because of investment decisions which have been
(legally) misinformed’; (2) ‘reduction of misinfor-
mation attracting more funds into the capital
market, resulting in . . . a lower cost of capital
and smaller bid-ask spreads’. There is not a general
agreement among researchers about the most
appropriate way to measure the constructs associ-
ated with market outcomes; as illustrated in the next
subsection, researchers sometimes use multiple
empirical measures for the same construct.
4.5. Examples of research into the effects of
accounting standards
Accounting researchers can study the effects of one
standard at a time or a wholesale change in
standards, and can use accounting-based, market-
based and analyst-based measures of effects. This
subsection describes some of the research design
decisions facing researchers and some of the
inherent limitations of this research. I use three
papers to illustrate these design decisions.34
Kohlbeck and Warfield (2008) examine the effects
on several accounting quality measures of 19
general purpose (that is, not industry-specific)
standards issued by the FASB between 1980 and
2005.35 Barth et al. (2008) examine the effects on
several accounting quality measures of the volun-
tary adoption of IAS/IFRS by 327 firms in 21
countries between 1990 and 2003. Daske et al.
(2008) examine the effects of mandatory IFRS
adoptions on several capital market outcomes for a
sample of over 3,100 IFRS adopters between 2001
and 2005. In the context of this discussion, an
improvement in an outcome indicator would be
evidence of a benefit associated with a change in
accounting standards.
The standard-setter’s approach to thinking about
the effects of a change in accounting standards
proceeds one standard at a time, suggesting a
research design that proceeds the same way.
Kohlbeck and Warfield (2008) adopt this approach
for 19 general purpose standards issued by the
FASB during 1980–2005. A reading of their paper
suggests the following design decisions and limi-
tations, all of which are noted by the researchers and
all of which could affect the degree to which the
research design could, as a practical matter, be used
by a standard-setter as part of a cost-benefit or
effects analysis of a single standard.
First, to analyse the effect of a specific standard,
the researcher must choose a pre-period (to bench-
mark the effects of the standard) and a post-period
(to capture the effects of the standard); Kohlbeck
andWarfield choose the four years ending two years
before, and the four years beginning two years after,
the implementation of each standard, and they
group all standards that have a common effective
year (for example, SFAS 142 and 144were effective
at the end of 2001 and SFAS 141 was effective for
business combinations after 30 June 2001). In
addition, standards are issued in adjacent years (for
example, SFAS 143 was effective from 15 June
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32 Results in Dechow and Dichev (2002) and Francis et al.
(2004, 2005) suggest that the innate portion of at least some
earnings attributes is larger than the discretionary or financial
reporting portion.
33My emphasis on comparability in this discussion is in
contrast to the conceptual framework exposure draft, which has
demoted comparability to a supporting role (an enhancing
qualitative characteristic, not a fundamental qualitative charac-
teristic; para. QC15–QC19). The exposure draft contains the
following qualified statement (para. QC19) that, ‘Although a
single economic phenomenon can be faithfully represented in
multiple ways, permitting alternative accounting methods for
the same economic phenomenon diminishes comparability and,
therefore, may be undesirable.’ (emphasis added)
34 I refer to these papers only to illustrate certain research
design decisions. This section is not intended to provide a
survey of research on the effects of accounting standards. Each
of the three example papers contains its own literature review
that provides information on other related papers.
35 There is variation in the applicability of even these general
purpose standards. While most or all entities would have
deferred tax assets and deferred tax liabilities (SFAS 109,
Accounting for Income Taxes, 1992, now part of Accounting
Standards Codification (ASC) Topic 740), not all firms would
have defined benefit pensions and post-retirement benefits
(SFAS 87, Employers’ Accounting for Pensions, 1985, and
SFAS 106, Employers’ Accounting for Postretirement Benefits
Other than Pensions, 1990, both now part of ASC Topic 712) or
asset retirement obligations (SFAS 143, Accounting for Asset
Retirement Obligations, 2001, now part of ASC Topic 410).
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2002, just six months after the SFAS 142/144
effective dates). As a result, there is not a precisely
demarcated pre-period for a standard, since the pre-
period for one standard could well overlap with the
post-period of another.
Second, all sample firms must apply these
general purpose standards, so there is no compari-
son (or control) group to use as a benchmark for
reporting in the absence of the change in guid-
ance.36 Furthermore, most of the time all (or nearly
all) firms must apply the standards starting at the
same time, so effects are clustered in calendar time
and potentially confounded with macroeconomic or
industry factors that affect financial reporting37.
Kohlbeck and Warfield use a trend variable to
capture factors unrelated to accounting standards
that are changing over time, and control variables
suggested by previous research for other known
effects.
Third, results may seem hard to interpret, in the
sense that the effect of a given standard may be too
small to detect in the data (a question of power) or a
given standard may have differing effects on
different accounting attributes. To increase power,
Kohlbeck and Warfield average their measures of
financial reporting effects across 11 standards
events (that is, 11 years in which 19 standards
became effective; some years have multiple stand-
ards). They note that their detailed results are
mixed, both across standards events and across the
attributes they consider. For example, averaged
across 11 standards events, they study two analyst-
based attributes, forecast accuracy (which
increases) and forecast dispersion (which does not
change significantly) and three accounting-based
attributes, persistence (no significant change), earn-
ings response coefficients and accruals quality (both
of which decrease).
Fourth, Kohlbeck and Warfield’s decision to
focus on standards issued by the FASB implies that
their sample firms face a common regulatory
environment, thereby eliminating one potential
confounding variable. However, managers of the
sample firms may or may not face common (across
managers) and constant (time-invariant) incentives
to make high quality reporting decisions, particu-
larly over such a long sample period. Reporting
entities may vary both in cross-section and over
time in the quality of either or both information/
internal control systems to support financial report-
ing and professional accounting expertise.
Furthermore, the demands placed by specific
standards on information systems and expertise
are likely to vary, with unknown effects on attrib-
utes of accounting information.
One substantial change in research designs,
which at least in principle addresses the question
of overlapping and confounding effects of individ-
ual standards as they are issued and adopted over
time and the question of effects that exist but are too
small to be detected in the data, is to study a
wholesale change in accounting standards such as
the voluntary or mandatory adoption of IAS/IFRS.
The design can focus on a single country or several,
as in Barth et al. (2008; 327 firms voluntarily
adopting IAS/IFRS in 21 countries) and Daske et al.
(2008; mandatory adoption of IFRS in 26 coun-
tries). A reading of these papers suggests the
following design decisions and limitations, all of
which are noted by the researchers and all of which
could affect the degree to which the research
designs could, as a practical matter, be used by a
standard-setter.
First, cross-country studies typically do not
contain even roughly equal numbers of firms per
country. For example, of the 21 countries studied by
Barth et al., six have one voluntary IAS/IFRS
adopter, three have two adopters, and over 70% of
the sample is from China, Germany and
Switzerland. Of the 26 countries and 8,726 firms
studied by Daske et al., four countries have 40 or
fewer firms and about 33% (60%) of the sample
observations are associated with two (five) coun-
tries. This concentration of observations in some
countries, with a relative dearth in other countries, is
a feature of the data that cannot be altered by the
researcher. Results obtained for the sample as a
whole, in terms of effects, may vary in their
applicability to a given jurisdiction.
Second, accounting researchers emphasise the
importance, in cross-country studies, of controlling
for differences in economic environments and
regulation, particularly enforcement. The outcome
indicators examined are affected by the standards
themselves and the way the standards are imple-
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36 An alternative cross-sectional research design would focus
on industry standards that would be applied only by certain
firms, for example, SFAS 66, Accounting for Sales of Real
Estate, 1982, now part of Accounting Standards Codification
(ASC) Topic 976. However, research (e.g. Francis et al., 2004)
suggests that a substantial portion of several accounting-based
attributes appears to be determined by the firm’s business
model, which would be a function of, among other things,
industry membership.
37 For example, US GAAP (specifically SFAS 115,
Accounting for Certain Investments in Debt and Equity
Securities, 1993, now part of ASC Topic 320) requires an
‘other than temporary impairment’ (OTTI) analysis for fair
value declines of available-for-sale and held-to-maturity secur-
ities. This requirement would not be expected to affect financial
reporting during times of rising or stable financial asset prices,
but would be expected to affect financial reporting during
market downturns.
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mented and enforced. Researchers can include
control variables or shift the research design to
accommodate these latter effects. With regard to a
research design decision, for example, Barth et al.
(2008) compare IAS/IFRS adopters before and after
adoption (the firm is its own control) and use
matched samples of adopters and non-adopters (to
control for inherent differences that are associated,
perhaps causally, with the adoption decision). If
both adopters and non-adopters in the same juris-
diction exhibit changes in attributes of accounting
information after the time period of IAS/IFRS
adoption and the adopter changes were more
positive, then that incremental difference could be
interpreted as a measure of the benefits of voluntary
IAS/IFRS adoption. Taking a related but distinct
approach, Daske et al. (2008) use three types of
controls in their examination of mandatory IFRS
adoptions: firms in jurisdictions that do not require
or permit IFRS reporting; firms in mandatory IFRS
adoption countries whose adoption dates are after
December 2005 because of their fiscal year-ends;
firm-fixed effects.38
Third, cross-country studies are not immune from
results that vary depending on which outcome
indicator is considered and depending on the
specifics of the research design. For example,
Barth et al. (2008) report that some results have
predicted signs but are not significant at conven-
tional levels and some results are contrary to
predictions. As a result, researchers tend to rely on
the weight of the evidence to support broad
conclusions about effects, with the understanding
that differences in research design decisions and
differences in choices of outcome indicators could
affect the results and conclusions.
It is possible, at least in principle, to apply the
standard-by-standard research design in Kohlbeck
and Warfield (2008) with a cross-country sample to
examine the effects of a change in IFRS for IFRS
users. An example would be revised IFRS 3,
effective July 2009. If practicable, this extension
would support an examination of the effects of
revisions in IFRS, as opposed to the wholesale
voluntary or mandatory adoptions that have been
more commonly studied. Such an extension would
require combining the research design decisions of
Kohlbeck and Warfield with those of Barth et al.
(2008) and Daske et al. (2008). In all cases,
however, empirical researchers using these designs
provide ex post analyses, based on outcomes
realised after a standard is issued, and cannot
provide an ex ante assessment of costs and benefits.
Although standard-setters refer to qualitative
characteristics of financial reporting information
(relevance, reliability and comparability) and
accounting researchers link these to empirical
attributes of accounting information, the most direct
measure of benefit to the owners of a firm that is
subject to authoritative guidance and changes in that
guidance is capital market outcomes such as
liquidity and the cost of capital. Under this view,
accounting quality as captured by accounting-
based, market-based and analyst-based attributes
is an intermediary outcome indicator between
financial reporting and market outcomes.39
Daske et al. (2008) analyse capital market effects
– liquidity, cost of equity and the book-to-market
ratio – in a cross-country study of mandatory IFRS
adoptions. Recognising that researchers do not
agree on how to measure certain capital market
effects, they use four proxies for liquidity and four
proxies for cost of equity (their measure is the
average of the four); they interpret the book-to-
market ratio as an indicator of equity valuation.
Recognising that the capital market effects they
study are not independent, they note that improve-
ments in liquidity could decrease the cost of capital
which would in turn increase equity values (other
things constant). Their results suggest that manda-
tory IFRS adoptions are associated with liquidity
benefits and, perhaps, cost of capital and valuation
benefits, subject to the interpretation that market
agents impound the effects of IFRS adoptions into
costs of capital and valuations before IFRS are
implemented – that is, the effects are anticipatory.
The authors also note that magnitudes of estimated
effects vary with the details of research design
choices.
Accounting research on the effects, particularly
the benefits, of accounting standards focuses on
outcome indicators, for example, accounting-
based measures of earnings quality or costs of
equity. With regard to these outcomes, accounting
researchers have not resolved the question of what
are the relative contributions of standards, imple-
mentation decisions,40 assurance and enforcement,
including actions by securities regulators and, if
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38 Fixed-effects models control for unobserved characteristics
that do not vary over time, but do vary across firms.
39 Francis et al. (2004) investigate the association between
several market-based and accounting-based earnings attributes
and several measures of the cost of equity capital.
40 I have suggested, in this discussion paper and elsewhere,
that whereas accounting researchers often focus on the role of
incentives in implementation decisions, it seems reasonable to
consider the possibility that management’s expertise and the
availability, or not, of high quality data are at least equally
important factors in implementations.
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applicable, private actions. Accounting researchers
often focus on some combination of incentives
facing managers and strictness of enforcement as
particularly important, and qualify their results as
dependent on the ability to control for these
effects. For example, Barth et al. (2008: 496– 497)
conclude that ‘Although we include research
design features to mitigate the effects of incentives
and the economic environment, we cannot be sure
that our findings are attributable to the change in
the financial reporting system [to IAS/IFRS] rather
than to changes in firms’ incentives and the
economic environment.’
This difficulty is an example of an identification
problem, which arises when more than one set of
factors (model parameters) can generate the out-
comes that are actually observed. In the specific
case of financial reporting standards and earnings
attributes that are commonly studied by accounting
researchers, the factors include the standards (our
object of interest), the objectivity and expertise of
those who implement the standards; the measure-
ment complexity that is inherent in the arrangement
being accounted for; the quality of the underlying
information systems and the data they collect; the
strength of assurance/attestation/governance func-
tions; the strength of enforcement. Research that
focuses on the effects of standards must of necessity
control for these factors or assume they are second
order effects or assume that they do not vary in ways
that would affect the outcomes. Any one of these
approaches is of course subject to its own difficul-
ties.
To summarise, academic accounting research
that considers the effects of accounting standards
has tended to focus on benefits or at least on
reporting outcomes and capital market effects.
Academic accounting researchers have not focused
much on survey-based methods to develop cost
data. Research that considers reporting outcomes,
for example, attributes of accounting information,
sometimes reports mixed results depending on
which outcome indicator is considered. Research
that considers capital market outcomes similarly
finds mixed results, depending on the specific
capital market outcome considered and research
design used. Researchers who examine accounting
outcomes and capital market outcomes are analys-
ing summary indicators that reflect the culmination
of a multi-step reporting process (for accounting
outcomes) or a multi-step reporting process plus a
market-use process (for capital market outcomes);
research has provided few definitive results as to
what are the most important effects in these
processes.
5. Concluding comments
Discussions of costs and benefits (or effects) of
individual financial accounting standards are a
pervasive feature of standard-setting; more gener-
ally, accounting researchers and others debate the
costs and benefits of regulating accounting disclo-
sures. The FASB laid out many of the issues –
without resolution – in a 1991 Special Report on
Benefits, Costs and Consequences of Financial
Accounting Standards. Accounting researchers
have focused on these issues from a variety of
perspectives but have not provided definitive results
or a generally agreed-upon approach to assessing
costs, or benefits, or consequences. In fact, if
allowances are made for the development of
research designs, empirical techniques and meas-
urement methods, many of the points made in the
1991 FASB Special Report remain valid today.
This discussion paper begins with a description
of conventional cost-benefit analysis and analyses
whether these techniques are, as a practical matter,
applicable to the evaluation of individual account-
ing standards. I separate the collection of informa-
tion about the cost to apply a standard from the
development of benefits measures, and consider the
distinction between a cost of applying an account-
ing standard and the consequences of the standard.
Cost information is perhaps most readily collectible
from survey data, although issues of non-response
and unreliable estimates surely arise. Accounting
researchers have studied the benefits of accounting
standards, or at least their effects, using archival-
empirical techniques and measures of financial
reporting outcomes and capital market outcomes.
Results of these investigations sometimes produce
mixed and even conflicting results, perhaps because
of inherent research design and measurement
difficulties. In particular, accounting researchers
focus on outcome indicators of the entire financial
reporting process, of which standards are but one
component (and researchers dispute the overall
importance of that component).
I believe that the discussion in this paper supports
the following conclusions. First, the way that
accounting standard-setters approach cost-benefit
(or effects) analysis does not align well with
conventional cost-benefit techniques applied to
public sector decision making, so it may make
sense to abandon terminology that has perhaps been
misleading, in the sense of non-descriptive of the
cognitive processes standard-setters actually follow.
Second, the techniques and methods of survey
research to elicit revealed preferences and stated
preferences might be used to gather data on the
costs of accounting standards; however, it is an
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empirical question as to whether the results would
be worth the out-of-pocket costs, time delays and
cognitive effort involved. Third, accounting
researchers have devoted significant effort to esti-
mating effects, including benefits, of changes in
accounting standards, including estimates based on
changes in the attributes of accounting information
and changes in capital market outcomes such as
liquidity and the cost of capital. Results of this
research, however, may not be entirely satisfactory
in terms of an effects analysis of a given financial
reporting standard, in the context of financial
reporting standard-setting, because of the limita-
tions of research designs and techniques.
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